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How We Got Here, and the Need for Change
In an influential law review article, Professor Mark Tushnet coined the term
“constitutional hardball”:
[Constitutional hardball] consists of political claims and practices—
legislative and executive initiatives—that are without much question
within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but
that are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional
understandings. It is hardball because its practitioners see themselves as
playing for keeps in a special kind of way; they believe the stakes of the
political controversy their actions provoke are quite high, and that their
defeat and their opponents’ victory would be a serious, perhaps permanent
setback to the political positions they hold.
I think it’s useful to model the dynamics of constitutional hardball in the realm of
Supreme Court vacancies as approximating an indefinitely iterated prisoner’s
dilemma: once one party defects from the previously established cooperative norms
regarding SCOTUS (and lower court) vacancies, it is rational for the responding
party to defect. Indeed, failing to do so is to disadvantage one’s own team against a
rival who has shown no intention of cooperating.
Of course, the reason it is the “prisoner’s dilemma” is that the socially optimal
response is mutual cooperation, not mutual defection. Analogously, the long-run
socially optimal way for the legislative and executive branches of governments to
approach the courts is probably not to use whatever fleeting partisan advantage they
may have at the moment to shift the judiciary as favorably towards themselves as
they can. While we should not be naïve about the political nature of the judiciary,
we must also not be flippant about the dangers to the rule of law of overt partisan
gaming. Such continued behavior could—justifiably!—lead large swaths of the
population to distrust the legitimacy of the judiciary. This is gravely dangerous to our
system of government.
Professor Matthew A. Seligman made many of these points in a very good working
paper two years ago:
[T]he present constitutional moment provides an unexpected and potentially
unique opening for the parties to cooperate to redesign the Supreme
Court nominations process permanently. That argument maps a pathway
to cooperation that connects the political incentives for a constitutional
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amendment to current gestures towards court packing. By presenting the
possibility—or, it can sometimes seem, inevitability—of a long-term cycle
of escalation in view of the dynamics of an iterated two-player game with
known strategies, it seeks to reframe the discussion away from winning an
adversarial game and toward changing the rules of that game to be more
cooperative.
In particular, . . . parties’ self-interested incentives are now aligned toward
cooperation in the two plausible models of the game of court packing in
our current political and social environment: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and
the Hawk-Dove Game. Because the threat of escalation is now so salient,
and the parties’ apparent commitment to playing hardball is now so deep,
under either model both parties should now recognize the value of pursuing
a long-term solution over securing shortterm advantage. A constitutional
amendment reforming the judicial appointments process has never been
easy, and it will not be now. It would be naïve to suggest otherwise. But
precisely because an amendment has never been more needed, it has
never been more politically attainable.
As Professor Seligman recognizes, however, achieving such an amendment will
be difficult under present incentives. Reform attempts without an Amendment are
likely to fail. For conservatives especially, altering the courts now, after securing a
very conservative majority unprecedented in recent history, will seem unappealing.
They may (perhaps correctly) conclude that, given their systematic advantages in the
Senate and therefore electoral college, endless escalation is a game they may be
able to win.
Assuming that Democrats win the House, Senate, and White House in November—
and that Republicans are not immediately amenable to a deescalatory constitutional
amendment—how ought Democrats respond to the situation and adversary they
face? This blog post proposes a simple mechanism that aims to force a stabilizing
constitutional amendment, such as that referenced by Seligman, forward while
preserving the option to escalate if they cannot secure cooperation from the
Republican party. While this idea has not been rigorously scrutinized, I hope that,
after further refinements, something like it can offer a release valve to the stress on
the legitimacy of the judiciary created by decades of constitutional hardball. If you
have improvements to the scheme proposed herein, please do put them forward.
Changing Republicans’ Incentives by Revocably
Threatening to Pack the Courts
I propose a two-step plan that Democrats should enact soon after they gain control
of Congress and the Presidency. In the first step, Democrats will pass a bill that
adds four new Supreme Court seats. Crucially, however, the bill would contain two
limitations:
1. The new seats would not be open until (say) September 1, 2022 (while the
Democrats still control the White House and Senate).
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2. The new seats would never be open (i.e., the bill would have no effect) if a
stabilizing constitutional Amendment was passed by that date.
The bill would have to specify what type of constitutional Amendment would suffice,
but basic parameters could be that the Amendment:
1. Fixes the number of Supreme Court vacancies at some odd number ≥9; and
2. Limits the tenure of Justices to between 9 and 20 years.
Proposal similar to that offered by DiTullio and Schochet should be sufficient, but the
precise numbers should be somewhat flexible to allow for bargaining. If Democrats
were feeling bold, they could specify that the Amendment must shift confirmation
authority from the Senate to the House, where they are at less of a systematic
disadvantage (though I see pushing Republicans on this as dangerous).
Before passing such a bill, Democrats should ensure that their base and state-level
politicians would be supportive of such an Amendment. They should then pass the
bill, at which point the Republicans would be faced with two options:
1. Escalatory option: Cede their hard-won SCOTUS majority to the Democrats in
two years by allowing President Biden to appoint four new Justices.
2. Stabilizing option: Work with the Democrats to pass the Amendment and
temporarily preserve their 2/3 SCOTUS majority.
Although I am not a Republican, I suspect that 2. is more appealing. If it is not, of
course, a Democratic trifecta could escalate the odds by increasing the number of
potential Supreme Court seats to be added in 2022. One hopes that the threat of a
new Democrat-appointed majority would be sufficient, but I have poor insight into
Republican psychology nowadays. And if Republicans are not willing to strike a deal
on the Amendment, they will have proven that they are not willing to cooperate even
on fair terms, and Democrats will be game-theoretically justified in escalating by
allowing the new seats to be added.
If, on the other hand, the Democratic base found the deal unsavory (perhaps due to
acrimony over the various Trump SCOTUS nominees), Congressional Democrats
could perhaps sell the deal by specifying that the Amendment would have to open
up two new SCOTUS seats in 2025, which Democrats would have the opportunity to
fill if they maintained control of the government (while also allowing for an informed
popular vote on which President ought to fill those vacancies). I would encourage
fellow Democrats to take the high ground here and “settle” for the fairly neutral
deescalatory Amendment offered here, but I probably care more about the long-term
stability of the judiciary (and less about temporary majorities) than many of my fellow
partisans.
Conclusion
It is possible that this proposal here is fatally flawed in some way. Obviously, given
my complete lack of above-average influence on the United States government, I do
not expect it to be adopted at all, much less adopted without careful scrutiny. But I
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hope that solutions of this flavor—forcing parties with adversarial interests to agree
on deescalatory strategies—can be found and implemented soon. If such solutions
can be found that do not resemble this specific proposal, I will be thrilled.
I encourage all participants in this debate to be willing to compromise. All reasonable
observers should be able to agree that the current system of SCOTUS appointments
is dangerously broken and therefore be willing to come to a stabilizing agreement
of some sort, even if it means limiting the longevity of hard-won Court majorities
or letting go of resentment over particular vacancies. The rule of law and domestic
tranquility may, regrettably, depend on it. But the shared bounty from improving our
constitutional systems is worth those short-term sacrifices.
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